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1 Introduction
This paper is primarily motivated by ongoing debates concerning the efficacy of fiscal stim-
ulus as a tool to fight demand driven recessions in small open economies with inflation-
targeting central banks (see Makin, 2016). In particular, we explore the implications for
the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy of introducing hysteresis effects and credit con-
strained households into a workhorse small open economy New Keynesian model. We also
explore the consequences of alternate simple monetary policy rules for the efficacy of fiscal
stimulus in this context.
This exploration is set against ongoing debates following the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) regarding the efficacy of fiscal stimulus. On the one hand a range of New Keyne-
sian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, including those presented by
Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011), and Woodford (2011), suggest that fiscal multi-
pliers may be greater than one in a closed economy setting only when nominal interest rates
are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB). However, Debortoli et al. (2019) present
evidence challenging the empirical relevance of the ZLB to macroeconomic outcomes. Fur-
ther, recent empirical studies including Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a and 2012b),
Fazzari et al. (2015), and Riera-Crichton et al. (2015) suggest that fiscal multipliers can be
greater than one in a broader range of recessionary situations, even in small open economies
(see IMF, 2012; Riera-Crichton et al., 2015; and Auerbach et al., 2019). These findings are
relevant in the Australian context because interest rates were not constrained by the ZLB
following the GFC. They also suggest the need for further development of the workhorse
New Keynesian model to help explain how fiscal policy can be effective in more general
recessionary conditions.
Debate has also surrounded whether a movement away from inflation targeting would be
optimal in the post-GFC era. For example Eggertsson et al. (2020), Woodford (2012 and
2013), and Sumner (2012 and 2017) have advocated for a shift to a nominal income level
targeting rule; McCallum (2015) a nominal income growth targeting rule; and Bernanke
(2017) and Bernanke et al. (2019) temporary price level targeting as a form of forward
guidance where interest rates are constrained by the ZLB. This debate has not addressed
questions concerning the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in the open economy
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context, hysteresis, and agent heterogeneity.
Further, Ball (2014), Bianchi et al. (2019), Blanchard et al. (2015), Cerra and Saxena
(2005), Cerra et al. (2013), Cerra and Saxena (2017), Cerra et al. (2020), Fatás and
Summers (2018), Gechert et al. (2019), and Jordà et al. (2020) have found broad empirical
support for the hysteresis hypothesis, whereby demand driven recessions can have highly
persistent, or even permanent effects, on the level of output and total factor productivity.
On the other hand, Hall and Kudlyak (2020) and Jordà et al. (2020) have observed the
tendency of employment and unemployment to recover following recessions, whereas output
and productivity commonly do not recover to levels that would be predicted based on their
pre-recession trends.
The dichotomy between permanent or highly persistent loss of output relative to trend
following recessions, and employment returning to trend is also reflected in recent Australian
data. To demonstrate this fact we follow the method of Blanchard et al. (2015) to determine
the deviation of real output from its pre-recession trend following the 1990-91 recession and
the GFC. Estimates of the evolution of output (blue) relative to trend (red) for the ten
years following a Harding and Pagan (2002) business cycle peak are presented in Figure 1
below. Following the December 1990 cyclical peak output declined by 6.2 per cent relative
to trend by the September quarter of 1993, whereas following the September 2008 cyclical
peak output declined by only 2.2 per cent relative to trend by March 2011. Output failed
to return to its Blanchard et al. (2015) pre-recession trend following each episode.
Figure 1: Real GDP (solid) relative to trend (dashed), $A billion seasonally adjusted, source:
ABS 5206.0
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A key historical difference between each of these business cycle episodes was that a large
scale discretionary fiscal stimulus program was implemented during the GFC period; whereas
this was not the case following the 1990-91 recession. Meanwhile, Figure 2 indicates that the
employment to population ratio has demonstrated a strong tendency to recover in absolute
terms following all recent Australian recessions.
Figure 2: Employment, per cent of working age population, seasonally adjusted (solid); HP
trend, λ = 10, 000 (dashed), source: ABS 6202.0
In response to these observations, an emerging literature has explored the fiscal (Engler
and Tervala, 2018; D’Alessandro et al., 2019) and monetary policy (Reifschneider et al.,
2015; Moran and Queralto, 2018; Acharya et al., 2019; Bianchi et al., 2019; Garga and
Singh, 2019; and Jordá et al., 2020) consequences of output hysteresis. Although, none of
these papers have focused on the small open economy setting. Further, no studies have
formally modelled the implications of hysteresis for the joint application of monetary and
fiscal stimulus.
A growing number of papers have also focused on the relevance of credit constraints
and agent heterogeneity to fiscal policy (see Gaĺı et al., 2007; Li and Spencer, 2016; and
McManus et al., 2020) and monetary policy (see McKay et al. 2016; and Kaplan et al.
2018). With the exception of Li and Spencer (2016), these papers have not utilised a small
open economy framework. With unconstrained monetary policy, small open economy models
featuring agent heterogeneity or hysteresis effects alone have not been able to generate output
multipliers greater than one.
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To address these issues this paper extends the Two Agent New Keynesian (TANK)
model into a small open economy environment where changes in the level of employment
endogenously affect the level of human capital formation in the economy, resulting in highly
persistent effects on the levels of output and productivity. A fraction of workers are assumed
not have access to credit markets, and cannot smooth their consumption over time. In the
spirit of Arrow (1962), Stadler (1990), Chang et al. (2002) and Engler and Tervala (2018),
the production technology incorporates a ‘learning by doing’ mechanism where changes in
employment lead to highly persistent shifts in the level of total factor productivity (TFP)
and output. We estimate model-consistent parameters for the ‘learning by doing’ process
using recent Australian data. Government is assumed to pursue a balanced budget fiscal
strategy, while the monetary authority follows a Henderson and McKibbin (1993)/ Taylor
(1993) type rule.
In the workhorse New Keynesian DSGE model without hysteresis or credit constraints,
recessions are short-lived, and output rapidly returns to its pre-recession trend. In these
models it is very difficult to rationalise stabilisation policy on a welfare or cost-benefit ba-
sis (as in Lucas, 1987 and 2003). However, in reality recoveries are often slow, and it is
common for the level of output to not return to its pre-recession trend following recessions
(see Ball, 2014; Blanchard et al., 2015; and Cerra et al., 2020). Cerra at el. (2020) and
Tervala (2021) argue that the potential benefits of stabilisation policy are much higher in
the presence of hysteresis because it increases the welfare costs of recessions. We show that
incorporating hysteresis and credit constraints into the New Keynesian model improves its
ability to account for slow and incomplete recoveries.
In this paper we demonstrate that incorporating hysteresis and credit constraints into the
model generates empirically plausible degrees of hysteresis based on the evidence of Furceri
at al. (2021), Kienzler and Schmid (2014) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014); and improves
the ability of the model to qualitatively match medium-term dynamics in the Australian
economy in the post-GFC period. The inclusion of credit constrained households generates
different short-run dynamics for output and employment in response to demand shocks, such
that employment may return to trend within standard business cycle durations, whereas
output need not. This addresses a short-coming of other contemporary open economy New
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Keynesian models such as Gaĺı and Monacelli (2005) where output and employment are
assumed to exhibit identical dynamics.
Credit constrained agents and hysteresis help the model generate output multipliers of
a comparable magnitude to those experienced in advanced economies during the immediate
post-GFC period (see in particular IMF, 2012; and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a
and 2012b). Cumulative and net present value output multipliers can exceed unity in the
presence of hysteresis and credit constraints, while employment multipliers are just under half
the magnitude of output multipliers- broadly consistent with empirical evidence presented
by Monacelli et al. (2010) and Auerbach et al. (2019). In models featuring hysteresis
and credit constraints, fiscal stimulus can be welfare enhancing under plausible assumptions
about the value of government spending in worker utility.
In terms of policy implications, we find that hysteresis and credit constraints amplify
output multipliers, and make fiscal stimulus welfare increasing. This is because credit con-
straints increase the effect of fiscal stimulus on private consumption, while the hysteresis
mechanism helps counteract crowding out via monetary policy and exchange rate offset.
Our results also suggest that fiscal stimulus can help reverse hysteresis effects, and restore
full employment more rapidly. Overall, the model provides a suggested mechanism whereby
discretionary fiscal stimulus can help stabilise the economy and be welfare enhancing. This is
the case even in a small open economy setting, with an inflation-targeting central bank, un-
constrained monetary policy, and where agents rationally anticipate stimulus will be balanced
budget financed through increased future tax liabilities (contra Valentine, 2011; Kirchner,
2019; and Makin, 2010, 2016 and 2019).
The paper also considers whether fiscal policy may have been more effective in the do-
mestic economy under alternative simple monetary policy rules. Alternative rules considered
include price-level targeting (PLT), nominal gross domestic product level (NGDPLT), and
growth targeting (NGDPGT) rules. In the GFC scenario, PLT delivers superior output and
employment stabilisation; and output, employment and welfare multipliers are all larger un-
der PLT relative to the other rules. This is because in the open economy context PLT not
only results in real interest rates being ‘lower for longer’ relative to other rules, but the real
exchange rate also. The hysteresis mechanism also means that PLT is more accommodative
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of expansionary fiscal policy compared to the other simple rules. These findings strengthen
the case for temporary PLT in response to demand driven recessions as recommended by
Bernanke (2017) and Bernanke et al. (2019), and provide theoretical support for the Federal
Reserve’s adoption of a ‘flexible form of average inflation targeting’ (Powell, 2020). With
credit constrained households and hysteresis, output, employment and worker welfare are al-
ways higher when monetary and fiscal stimulus are combined under all alternative monetary
policy rules.
2 Model
The modelling environment features two regions, domestic and foreign. The domestic region
is a small country, and the foreign region is modelled as a single large country. The environ-
ment features a continuum of infinitely lived workers and firms indexed by z ∈ [0, 1], n (1−n)
are domestic (foreign), with the global population of firms and workers both normalised to
unit size.
2.1 Workers
This paper departs from the assumption of an aggregate representative worker in the spirit
of the recent literature concerning Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models
(see Kaplan, et al., 2018; and McKay et al., 2016 and 2017), and following in particular
the TANK approach of Gaĺı et al. (2007) and Li and Spencer (2016). Debortoli and Gaĺı
(2017) demonstrate that more tractable TANK models can match the aggregate dynamics
of more complicated HANK models featuring uninsurable labour income risk and borrowing
constraints quite well.
In both regions a fraction 1 − λ of workers have access to credit markets, and are able
to smooth consumption over time. These workers are referred to as optimising or Ricardian
workers. On the other hand λ can only consume out of current income and endowments.
These are referred to as non-Ricardian workers. The utility function for all workers, Ricar-
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Where Et is the expectations operator, β is the worker’s discount rate, ε
TP
s is a time pref-
erence shock, Ct is an index of real consumer goods and services, lt(z) is workers’ labour
supply, and ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. Gt is government spending at date t,
and % is the weight of government consumption in worker utility.
Ricardian workers hold bonds, own and receive dividends from firms, and pay a lump-sum
tax to government. The nominal budget constraint for Ricardian workers in the domestic










Where lR,t and CR,t are the labour supply and consumption of Ricardian workers, wt is the
nominal wage, vt are financial returns derived from domestic firms, and TR,t are lump sum
taxes levied on Ricardian households. Bt is the nominal price of home country bonds with
a pay off of $1 dollar of home country currency in period t + 1, it is the nominal interest
rate on bonds.
Domestic bonds are assumed to be the only internationally traded assets, and we denote
Bt as nominal domestic bonds held by domestic workers, and B
∗
t as nominal domestic bonds
held by foreign workers. Therefore, the asset market clearing condition is given as follows:
nBt + (1− n)B∗t = 0 (3)
Foreign bonds denoted B∗ft in foreign country currency can only be held by foreign Ricardian
workers. The nominal budget constraint of Ricardian workers in the foreign economy is
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To close the model, a debt elastic risk premium is assumed over uncovered interest parity
(UIP) following Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Bergin (2006):





+ ω(exp(Bt)− 1) (5)
Where ω(exp(Bt)− 1) is the country-specific risk premium.
The optimality conditions for Ricardian workers in the domestic and foreign economy













Non-Ricardian workers earn income from labour and pay lump sum taxes to their national
government. However, they do not have access to credit markets, and therefore cannot
smooth consumption over time. Further, they do not have any residual claim over the
profits of firms. The non-Ricardian workers optimality conditions are therefore defined
by their flow budget constraint, and their labour supply relation with the ‘N ’ sub-script
denoting ‘Non-Ricardian’. The optimality conditions are as follows:







Aggregate consumption and labour supply in the home economy are therefore defined as
follows, with the same identities holding for the foreign economy:
Ct = λCN,t + (1− λ)CR,t (10)
lt = λlN,t + (1− λ)lR,t (11)
Turning to the transnational dimension of workers’ consumption decisions, the private
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Here Cht and C
f
t are indexes of domestically and foreign produced goods respectively, αn
represents the share of domestic goods in the consumption basket with α > 1 capturing
the degree of home bias, and ψ capturing the cross-country substitutability of domestic and

























Where θ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same country of
origin, and cht (z) (c
f
t (z)) represents the domestic workers’ consumption of the domestic
(foreign) good z.
Private demand functions for domestic (foreign) goods by domestic (foreign) workers are











































Where pht (z) and p
f
t (z) represent the home country price of home and foreign produced
goods respectively. Pht and P
f
t represent the consumer price indexes in the home and
foreign countries, and Cht and C
f
t are the respective consumption baskets. All price indexes
are expressed in domestic currency terms, and foreign currency indexes are denoted by an
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Firms are assumed to produce a differentiated good with capital in fixed supply of one unit.
The production technology of firms is therefore given as follows:
yt(z) = at(z)lt(z) (22)
With yt(z) representing the output of firm z, at(z) the level of TFP, and lt(z) the labour
supply utilised by the firm. The Auerbach et al. (2019) finding of no discernable crowding
out of private capital accumulation related to government consumption provides an empirical
rationale to exclude physical capital from the production technology. As does the finding
of Christian (2010, 2014) that the stock of human capital may be significantly larger than
the stock of physical capital. Following Chan et al. (2002) and Engler and Tervala (2018)
hysteresis effects are assumed to emerge in production through ‘learning by doing’. As
worker employment duration increases they become more efficient at performing job tasks,
and labour productivity increases. In the simple production function employed in this model
environment, TFP is equivalent to labour productivity. Therefore, the level of employee skill
and TFP accumulates over time based on the level of employment in the economy which is
reflected in the following log-linear process:
ât(z) = φât−1(z) + ηl̂t−1(z) (23)
Where hatted variables represent deviations from steady state. This equation formalises the
notion that the level of employment in the current period effects the level of productivity in
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the next period with elasticity η. If φ = 1 changes in employment will permanently change
the level of TFP, and with 0 < φ < 1 the level of employment has a persistent effect on the
level of TFP that erodes over time.





t (z)− wtlt(z) (24)
subject to the production technology (equation (22)) and demand for its products from




















(1− n)α∗(C∗t +G∗t )
(25)
Under the assumption of no rigidities in price setting, profit maximisation with respect to







Price stickiness is introduced via the familiar Calvo (1983) algorithm of stochastic price
adjustment where firms can reset their price in each period with a probability 1− γ that is
independent of time. Under Calvo pricing the firm seeks to maximise the discounted present
























































Log-linearising equation (29) results in a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
p̂ht (z) = βγEt(p̂
h
t+1(z)) + (1− βγ)(ŵt − ât(z)) + ε
p
t (30)
Where εpt is a zero mean cost push shock.
2.3 Policy
Public consumption indexes are assumed to be structurally identical to private consumption
indexes, and public demand functions for domestic and foreign produced goods are defined
in an analogous way to private demand functions. Following Rendahl (2016) we assume
government follows a simple balanced budget fiscal rule which is consistent, at least in
expectational terms, with Australia’s medium-term fiscal strategy (see Gruen and Sayegh,
2005):
PtTt = PtGt (31)
Where Tt ≡ λTN,t + (1 − λ)TR,t. We assume that Ricardian and Non-Ricardian workers
face the same rate of tax which implies that their tax payments increase in proportion to
their population shares when government spending increases. Defining ĝt = (Gt − G)/Y
and t̂t = (Tt − T )/Y , the government budget constraint can be simplified to the following
expression in terms of deviations from steady state:
ĝt = t̂t (32)
Government spending is assumed to evolve according to an exogenous autoregressive process
of the following form:
ĝt = ρ




Where ρg is between zero and one, and εgt is an i.i.d government spending shock variable
with zero mean.
The Reserve Bank in the model is assumed to follow a standard Henderson-McKibbin-
Taylor type monetary reaction function of the following form:
ît = µ1ît−1 + (1− µ1)(µ2∆P̂t + µ3Ŷt) + εit (34)
Which assumes that the monetary authority responds to deviations of inflation and output
from the initial steady state with some interest rate smoothing. εit is a zero mean i.i.d
monetary policy shock.
2.4 Equilibrium conditions
Combining equations (2), (8) (24), and (31) yields the overall budget constraint of the
domestic economy:
Bt − (1 + it−1)Bt−1 = pht (z)yt(z)− PtCt − PtGt (35)
The model is then log-linearised around a symmetric steady state with domestic and foreign
bonds assumed to be in zero net supply. For simplicity, productivity is normalised to one
and public spending zero in the initial steady state. Combining equations (7), (9), (22) and
(26) yields the initial steady state level of employment:








The log-linearised Euler condition for optimising households can be expressed as follows:
ĉR,t = Et{ĉR,t+1} − (̂it − Et{π̂t+1}+ Et{∆ε̂TPt+1}) (37)













Assuming a symmetric equilibrium where CR = CN = C0 = y0 = l0(z), and a perfectly






















The log-linearised expressions for aggregate consumption and labour supply are given as
follows:
ĉt = λĉN,t + (1− λ)cR,t (41)
l̂t = λl̂N,t + (1− λ)l̂R,t (42)
Noting that
l̂N,t = ϕ(ŵt − p̂t − ĉN,t) (43)
and
ŵt − p̂t = ĉt + ϕ−1 l̂t (44)











Applying the operator (1− L−1) to equation (41) provides us with:
ĉt − Etĉt+1 = λ[ĉN,t − EtĉN,t+1] + (1− λ)[ĉR,t − EtĉR,t+1] (46)
Then substituting equations (36), (42), (43), and (44) into (45) yields the equilibrium Euler
condition for aggregate consumption:
ĉt = Et{ĉt+1} − σ(ît − Et{π̂t+1}+ ∆ε̂TPt+1)− ΓEt{∆l̂t+1}+ κEt{∆t̂N,t+1} (47)
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Where
σ = (1− λ)
(






















Thus the aggregate Euler condition for consumption is the only equilibrium condition
that displays dependence on the fraction of Non-Ricardian workers. The presence of Non-
Ricardian workers creates a direct effect of the level of employment in the economy on
consumption in addition to the indirect real interest rate channel of the workhorse New
Keynesian small open economy model without credit constrained workers. The model is
solved using the algorithm proposed for solving rational expectations models by Klein (2000),
implemented using software developed by McCallum (2001).
3 Calibration
3.1 Hysteresis process
An obvious empirical challenge confronting a theory of business cycles where human capital
plays a central role is that no statistical agency currently maintains human capital accounts.
This is in part due to controversies regarding measurement (see Jorgenson and Fraumeni,
1989 and 1992; Christian, 2010 and 2014; Abraham, 2010; McGrattan, 2010; and Fraumeni
et al., 2015). Nonetheless our model suggests a relatively straightforward, albeit arguably
narrow, way to empirically capture the value of human capital. In our model the first order
conditions for labour imply that real wages are driven by productivity, which in the ‘learning
by doing’ model can be represented as a moving average of past employment.





Invoking Wold’s Representation Theorem, equation 52 provides a model consistent empirical
real wage equation that can be simply estimated via non-linear least squares.
ŵt − p̂t =
4∑
j=1
βj(ŵt−j − p̂t−j) + η
4∑
k=0
φk l̂t−1−k + εt (52)
Where 0 < η < 1, 0 < φ < 1, and
∑4




0, and the real wage equation retains theoretical consistency with our structural model.
To estimate this model we use the Wage Price Index (WPI) deflated using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) in log deviations from its Hodrick-Prescott filtered stochastic trend (λ =
1600) as the dependent variable. For the employment variable we use the employment
level, employment to population ratio, quarterly hours worked, and quarterly hours worked
per worker all measured in log deviations from their respective Hodrick-Prescott filtered
stochastic trends (λ = 1600) also. Similar, although less precise, estimates for the primary
parameters of interest were obtained when data was de-trended using the Hamilton (2018)
Filter and Beveridge-Nelson Filter proposed by Kamber, Morley, and Wong (2018). Results
are contained in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Human capital accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Employment to Hours worked Hours worked
population ratio per worker
β1 0.94*** 0.91*** 0.93*** 0.92***
(0.66, 1.21) (0.58, 1.15) (0.63, 1.23) (0.57, 1.26)
β2 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.13
(-0.24, 0.46) (-0.24, 0.54) (-0.27, 0.53) (-0.28, 0.55)
β3 -0.22* -0.26* -0.25* -0.23*
(-0.49, 0.03) (-0.52, 0.01) (-0.54, 0.04) (-0.50, 0.04)
exp(φ) 0.93 0.91** 0.94 0.90
(0.78, 1.10) (0.84, 0.99) (0.83, 1.07) (0.72, 1.13)
exp(η) 0.20** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.30***
(0.13, 0.31) (0.18, 0.42) (0.15, 0.34) (0.16, 0.56)
R2 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.45
BG LM test (pr.) 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.14
Harvey test (pr.) 0.32 0.43 0.08 0.26
Chow test (pr.) 0.36 0.44 0.15 0.12
Notes: ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance levels respectively. 95 per
cent confidence intervals reported in brackets. Estimation period is 1998Q3 to 2019Q4. All variables expressed in log
deviation from Hodrick-Prescott Filter trend (λ = 1600). Estimates for φ and η are exponentiated to facilitate direct




t−1(z). BG LM test is a fourth order Breusch (1978) - Godfrey
(1978) LM test with null of no serial correlation. Harvey test is the Harvey (1976) heteroskedasticity test with null of
homoskedastic errors. The Chow test is the Chow (1960) break point test with assumed break date of 2009Q2, and null
hypothesis of no structural break.
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Although estimates for φ are generally statistically insignificant, they point to a likely
range of values between 0.9 and 1, higher than the value of 0.8 suggested by Chang et al.
(2002) based on US micro-econometric evidence. Estimates for η are statistically significant,
and concentrated within the range of 0.2 to 0.3, again slightly higher than the range of
0.11 to 0.15 suggested by Chang et al. (2002), and the range of 0 to 0.2 suggested as
reasonable for the US by De Long and Summers (2012). For the domestic region we use
the calibration φ = 0.93 and η = 0.2 based on results from the employment levels equation
(Column 1), which is the most model consistent specification. For the international region
we set φ∗ = 0.96 following Reifschneider et al. (2015) and η∗ = 0.13 based on Chang et
al. (2002). We also conduct robustness analysis using φ = φ∗ = 0.99 following Engler and
Tervala (2018) and φ = φ∗ = 0.8 following Chang et al. (2002) and D’Alessandro et al.
(2019); and η = η∗ = 0.11 and η = η∗ = 0.30.
3.2 Standard parameters
The workers’ discount factor is set to β = β∗ = 0.99, and the relative size of the home
economy n = 0.017 is set to reflect the post-GFC average size of the Australian economy
relative to world GDP in constant 2010 US dollar terms. The home bias parameter α = 46.5
is calibrated to match the post-GFC average import to GDP ratio for Australia over the
period 2008-2019 (0.21).
We set the Frisch elasticity of labour supply equal to unity in both regions ϕ = ϕ∗ = 1.
This is a common choice for Australian DSGE models, including Rees et al. (2016), Langcake
and Robinson (2013) and Jääskelä and Nimark (2011). Chetty et al. (2013) argue that the
Frisch elasticity should be set equal to 0.5 in macro models based on microeconomic evidence,
while Keane and Rogerson (2012) argue that small micro elasticities can be consistent with
large macro elasticities, and prefer a range of 1 to 2. Generally, larger elasticities are more
appropriate for models focused on the extensive margin of the labour market as here. We
conduct robustness analysis using ϕ = ϕ∗ = 0.5 and ϕ = ϕ∗ = 2.
A standard value suggested for the cross-country substitutability parameter ψ is 1.5 (see
Dong, 2012). In the recent Australian context this calibration is employed by Langcake
and Robinson (2013). However, where Bayesian estimation techniques are used parameter
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estimates vary between 0.58 in Justiano and Preston (2010) to 1.3 in Jääskelä and Nimark
(2011). Therefore we select ψ = 1 which is also consistent with Li and Spencer (2016). We
select θ = 6 for the within-country substitutability parameter following Gaĺı and Monacelli
(2005). The country-specific risk premium for the Australian economy is ω = 0.001 consistent
with Rees et al. (2016).
Estimates of the Calvo parameter γ in recent Australian studies mostly range between
0.7 and 1. On the low side, Li and Spencer (2016) estimate a Calvo parameter of 0.38.
Other estimates include 0.79 in Justiano and Preston (2010), 0.89 in Nimark (2009), 0.69
in Jääskelä and Nimark (2011), and 0.95 in Langcake and Robinson (2013). Based on these
estimates γ is set to 0.85. For the foreign economy γ∗ = 0.75 following Rabanal and Tuesta
(2010) and Engler and Tervala (2018).
Australian estimates for the interest smoothing parameter µ1 range from 0.49 in Li and
Spencer (2016) to 0.87 in Nimark (2009). Given that most estimates are between 0.82 and
0.87, we select µ1 = 0.85. Estimates for the weight on inflation in the Taylor rule µ2 vary
between 0.41 in Nimark (2009) and 1.75 in Jääskelä and Nimark (2011), with most estimates
close to the standard value of 1.5 which we select. Finally, values for the weight on output
in the monetary policy rule vary between 0.02 in Nimark (2009) and 0.72 in Langcake and
Robinson (2013), with most estimates between 0.10 and 0.30. Given these estimates we
select µ3 = 0.2. For the foreign economy µ
∗
1 = 0.79, µ
∗
2 = 1.5, and µ
∗
3 = 0.5 following
Clarida et al. (2000).
We set λ = 0.27 based on ABS (2019) evidence that the proportion of households re-
porting no debt in Australia has been relatively stable at around 27 per cent between 2003-
04 and 2017-18. This is probably a relatively conservative estimate of the proportion of
Non-Ricardian agents in the model; for example Gaĺı et al. (2007) set the proportion of
Non-Ricardian households in their model to 50 per cent following the evidence of Campbell
and Mankiw (1989). We set λ∗ = 0.3 following Kaplan et al. (2014) who find 25 - 40 per
cent of US households are Hand-to-Mouth (HtM), 30 per cent of households in Canada, the
UK and Germany, and less than 20 per cent of households in France, Italy and Spain.
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3.3 GFC scenario
Our GFC simulation assumes a large common global time preference shock that is equivalent
to 14 per cent of initial consumption. The Australian share market All Ordinaries Index fell
by 14 per cent in October 2008, and the US market fell by around 17 per cent over the same
period. Concurrently the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index fell by 18 per cent
over the month of October 2008, while Australian consumer sentiment data is unavailable
over this time period. Overall, this evidence suggests that a common time preference shock of
the magnitude proposed appears reasonable given changes in stock valuations and consumer
confidence in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Gaĺı (2020) suggests values
for the persistence of the time preference shock of between ρTP = 0.91 and ρTP = 0.99, and
we set ρTP = ρTP
∗
= 0.96.
We also assume a domestic monetary policy shock equal to 425 basis points consistent
with the Reserve Bank of Australia’s reduction in the cash rate between September 2008
and April 2009. The foreign monetary policy shock is set equal to 250 basis points - half way
between the 200 basis point reduction in the United States and 300 basis points in Europe
at the onset of the GFC.
Finally, the shock to Australian Government spending is set equal to 5.6 per cent of GDP
which is consistent with the overall increase in discretionary spending between 2008 and 2012
(see Charlton, 2019). The IMF (2009) assessed G20 discretionary fiscal expansions of 0.5
per cent of G20 GDP in 2008, 1.5 per cent in 2009, and -0.5 per cent in 2010, representing
an increase equivalent to 1.2 per cent of world GDP over the three years. Therefore, the
foreign fiscal shock is set equal to 1.2 per cent of GDP. We set ρg = 0.9 following Gaĺı et al.
(2007) and ρg
∗
= 0.75 following Iwata (2013) which helps represent the fact that Australia’s
fiscal response to the GFC was more persistent than other advanced economies.
4 Propagation of shocks in the model
The following section focuses on the dynamic response of the domestic economy to combined
demand shocks, noting that the response of the foreign economy is qualitatively similar,
albeit it with a more limited monetary and fiscal policy response.
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4.1 Shock propagation without hysteresis and credit constraints
In these initial simulations credit constraints and hysteresis effects are suppressed (λ =
λ∗ = 0 and η = η∗ = φ = φ∗ = 0 respectively). Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the
domestic economy in response to the common time preference and monetary shocks, with
internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus ‘With FE’ and ‘Without FE’. The model without
hysteresis effects and credit constraints generates what may be regarded as standard insights
from mainstream small open economy models along the lines of Monacelli and Gaĺı (2005),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2005, 2007), and Justiano and Preston (2010) when subjected to
demand shocks. The comparatively large fiscal and monetary policy intervention helps
reduce the impact of the GFC on output, while also resulting in the crowding out of private
consumption. With the real exchange rate defined as
StP∗t
Pt
and terms of trade defined as
the ratio of domestic export to import prices, the simple model does a reasonable job of
matching their simultaneous depreciation at the outset of the GFC, and appreciation during
the early phase of the recovery as would be expected based on Bergin (2006). Synonymous
output and employment dynamics do not match historical empirical evidence well.
4.2 Shock propagation with hysteresis and credit constraints
Figure 4 shows the change in short-run dynamics in the domestic economy when hysteresis
and credit constraints are incorporated into the model. Fiscal stimulus increases output,
consumption and productivity while actually reducing inflation as in the empirical evidence
presented for the US economy by D’Alessandro et al. (2019), and models that incorporate
‘learning by doing’ in the production technology including Engler and Tervala (2018) and
D’Alessandro et al. (2019). With coordinated fiscal stimulus domestic consumption and
output are significantly higher than they would have been without fiscal stimulus. Fiscal
stimulus does not crowd out private consumption, with consumption significantly higher in
the medium to long-term in particular. Employment can return to its initial trend within
business frequencies, whereas output does not consistent with Jordà et al. (2020).
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Figure 3: Domestic dynamics: Without hysteresis and credit constraints, with and without
coordinated fiscal expansion (FE), quarterly
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Figure 4: Domestic dynamics: With hysteresis and credit constraints, with and without
coordinated fiscal expansion (FE), quarterly
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The ratio of the peak fall in TFP relative to output in our model is 0.39, which compares
closely to the empirical evidence presented by Furceri et al. (2021) who find a value of 0.42
following recessions in 18 advanced economies between 1970 and 2014. Defining the degree of
hysteresis as the ratio of the fall in output in the final period to the fall in output in the initial
period as in Kienzler and Schmid (2014) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014), we find a degree
of hysteresis of 0.19 after four years. This is towards the lower end of the 0.2 to 0.3 range
suggested as reasonably by Kienzler and Schmid (2014). The degree of hysteresis falls to
zero midway through the fifth year, which is consistent with the empirical evidence presented
by Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) for the Australian economy. Our simulation implies that the
degree of hysteresis was relatively low in Australia because it undertook a comparatively
large fiscal stimulus program.
Short-term real exchange rate and terms of trade dynamics are similar to the model
without hysteresis and credit constraints. Hysteresis effects imply that relative employment,
and therefore productivity, will be higher under the scenario where fiscal stimulus is relatively
larger in the domestic economy. This in turn implies lower domestic inflation and higher
international competitiveness in the medium-term which translates into a lower real exchange
rate and lower terms of trade over this time period compared to scenarios without fiscal
expansion. The comparatively greater medium-term depreciation of the real exchange rate
and terms of trade qualitatively matches Australia’s post-GFC experience well.
4.3 A closer look at domestic output and employment dynamics
Figure 5 provides a comparison of output dynamics in the domestic economy under alterna-
tive assumptions regarding the presence or absence of hysteresis effects and credit constraints,
and a coordinated fiscal expansion. Firstly, in the presence of credit constraints, hysteresis
and a coordinated fiscal expansion, the model generates a reduction in GDP of roughly 2.4
per cent relative to steady state at peak. As discussed, this matches very closely the 2.2 per
cent decline of GDP relative to trend that occurred between the December quarter of 2008
and the March quarter of 2011 (see Figure 1), albeit the cyclical trough in the data occurs
much later than in the model. This is due to the prevalence of forward looking optimising
agents in the model combined with the definition of the shock processes. These shortcomings
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are shared with the standard textbook New Keynesian open economy model.
Figure 5: Domestic output dynamics with and without hysteresis and credit constraints
(CC), with and without coordinated fiscal expansion (FE), quarterly
It is in the medium-term where the hysteresis mechanism greatly enhances the ability
of the model to match the data. After two years the model generates output 1.0 per cent
below initial trend, and 0.3 per cent after four years, compared to 1.0 per cent and 0.6
per cent in Figure 1, much closer than alternate model specifications. Interestingly, in the
data output is 0.3 per cent below initial trend after 15 quarters, with the further 0.3 per
cent decline in output in the 16th quarter post-GFC associated with the collapse of the
Australian mining boom at the end of 2011 and through the early stages of 2012. Further, a
key characteristic of the model with hysteresis is that the demand driven recession generates
a highly persistent loss of output relative to pre-recession trend that need not be reversed
within typical business cycle frequencies. In the baseline calibration it takes over 18 years for
output to return to its pre-recession trend where there is no fiscal stimulus, and over 5 years
with substantial fiscal stimulus. This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented
by Cerra and Saxena (2005), Cerra et al. (2013), Cerra and Saxena (2017), Ball (2014),
Blanchard et al. (2015), Fatás and Summers (2018) and Gechert et al. (2019). By contrast,
models without hysteresis and credit constraints greatly over-estimate the level of GDP and
the speed at which the economy will return to its initial trend in each scenario.
Figure 6 looks at domestic employment dynamics under alternative assumptions regard-
ing the presence or absence of hysteresis effects and credit constraints, and a coordinated
fiscal expansion. As noted, without hysteresis and credit constraints, output and employ-
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ment dynamics are identical in the textbook New Keynesian small open economy model.
This is obviously an undesirable feature of this model for policy analysis given that output
and employment clearly have different dynamics in the data. In Figure 2 employment in
Australia during the GFC employment declined by just under 2 per cent relative to trend
between the September quarter of 2008 and the September quarter of 2009. In the model
with hysteresis and credit constraints employment declines by 2.4 per cent relative to trend;
however, given the definition of shock processes, rational expectations and the prevalence of
forward looking agents in the model, again the cyclical trough occurs much sooner than in
the data. Overall, the model does a better job of matching the short-term dynamics of em-
ployment compared to output, consistent with other New Keynesian models (see Monacelli
et al., 2010). Whereas output fails to return to its pre-GFC trend within five years in the
model, employment surpasses its pre-GFC trend after 11 quarters. In the data employment
returns to its stochastic trend around 8 quarters after its September 2008 peak. Under the
model with hysteresis and credit constraints it is possible for employment to return to its
pre-recession trend within typical business cycle frequencies, while output need not. This
feature of the model appears to match the general experience of many advanced economies
well (see Jordà et al., 2020)), including Australia following the 1990-91 recession and the
GFC.
Figure 6: Domestic employment dynamics with and without hysteresis and credit constraints
(CC), with and without coordinated fiscal expansion (FE), quarterly
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5 Fiscal policy under hysteresis: Output, welfare and
employment multipliers
This section seeks to evaluate the efficacy of fiscal stimulus through the calculation of output,
employment and welfare multipliers. First, we define cumulative multipliers for output and
employment as the difference in the cumulative change of output and employment in the case
with a fiscal expansion (FE), and the cumulative change of output and employment in the
case without a fiscal expansion (WFE), divided by the cumulative increase in government




























Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Uhlig (2010) and Fisher and Peters (2010), we











Welfare multipliers are defined as the change in welfare in consumption equivalent terms
associated with a unit increase in government spending as in Engler and Tervala (2018),
Sims and Wolff (2018) and Rendahl (2016). The derivation of the welfare multiplier follows






Where Lt reflects the proportion of initial consumption that a domestic worker would be
prepared to pay to be as well off in the fiscal expansion case as the alternative case, assuming
labour supply remains constant.
Cumulative output and employment multipliers, and net present value output multipliers,
are calculated over 16 quarters; while welfare multipliers are calculated over 2000 quarters.
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As a central case, following Song et al. (2012) it is assumed that workers place a weight of
0.4 on government consumption relative to private consumption- and sensitivity analysis is
included for the cases where government consumption is viewed as a complete waste (% = 0),
or of equivalent value to private consumption in worker utility (% = 1).
Table 2 provides cumulative output and employment multiplier calculations, and net
present value multiplier calculations for output derived from models including and excluding
hysteresis effects and credit constraints. The inclusion of credit constraints and hysteresis
in the model increases output multipliers, with hysteresis effects the largest contributor to
these increases. The finding that credit constraints increase the size of the output multiplier
is consistent with Gaĺı et al. (2007) and Li and Spencer (2016); and that hysteresis effects
increase output multipliers is consistent with Engler and Tervala (2018). Hysteresis reduces
employment multipliers marginally because higher levels of human capital translate into
higher levels of output per unit of labour input, and hence slightly lower labour demand.
Table 2: Output and Employment Multipliers
Output Employment
Hys. CC CM NPVM CM
No No 0.59 0.60 0.59
No Yes 0.72 0.73 0.72
Yes Yes 1.28 1.27 0.50
A cumulative output multiplier of 1.28 in the presence of credit constrained households
and hysteresis is consistent with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) who find cumulative
output multipliers of between 1 and 1.5 during recessions in the US, and IMF (2012) findings
of cumulative output multipliers associated with a positive government spending shock when
output gaps are negative of 1.2 in G7 countries. Li and Spencer (2016) find a ‘no monetary
response’ output multiplier of 1.26 during the post-GFC period in Australia in an estimated
DSGE model. Our model predicts a similar multiplier without arbitrarily ‘switching off’ the
central bank’s monetary policy response function.
The interaction of credit constraints and hysteresis effects helps generate employment
multipliers under half the magnitude of output multipliers in the preferred model (around 40
per cent lower). This is broadly consistent with Monacelli et al. (2010) who find cumulative
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unemployment multipliers of -0.43 at the two year horizon for the United States between
1954 and 2006. This translates into an employment multiplier of roughly 0.59 for the US
over the period, utilising the elasticity of employment with respect to unemployment between
1948 and 2013 estimated by Ball et al. (2017) of -0.73.
Table 3 presents the welfare multipliers associated with the coordinated fiscal expansion
scenario. Without hysteresis, fiscal stimulus reduces worker welfare in consumption equiv-
alent terms consistent with Sims and Wolff (2018). However, in the model with hysteresis
fiscal stimulus becomes welfare enhancing as in Engler and Tervala (2018). Rendahl (2016)
derives a labour search model with nominal wage rigidity where a prolonged economic crisis
accompanied by a substantial increase in government spending increases worker welfare by
0.65 dollars of private consumption for each dollar of government spending. Overall, the
range of welfare multipliers reported here sits comfortably within that suggested by Rendahl
(2016).
Table 3: Welfare Multipliers
Welfare multipliers
Hys. CC % = 0 % = 0.4 % = 1
No No -0.76 -0.51 -0.01
No Yes -0.75 -0.50 -0.02
Yes Yes 0.08 0.31 0.75
Table 4 contains multiplier robustness analysis for alternative parameter choices for the
domestic and foreign economies. Overall, net present value output multipliers and welfare
multipliers are robust to a broad range of parameter choices. Cumulative output multipliers
all lie in the range of 1 to 1.5 consistent with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a). Under
the baseline assumption concerning the weight of government consumption in utility % =
0.4, the overwhelming majority of parametrisations indicate that workers are willing to
sacrifice real consumption opportunities in exchange for fiscal stimulus. The Australian
Government undertook fiscal consolidation in the Post-GFC period primarily though bracket
creep. Murphy (2016) suggests that the marginal excess burden of bracket creep in the
Australian context is around 0.18. This suggests that stimulus can be net-welfare improving
under the overwhelming majority of parametrisations in the central case where % = 0.4.
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Table 4: Parameter Robustness
Output Emp. Welfare multipliers
Parameter CM NPVM CM % = 0 % = 0.4 % = 1
Baseline 1.28 1.27 0.50 0.08 0.31 0.75
ϕ = ϕ∗ = 0.5 (1) 1.29 1.29 0.49 0.05 0.25 0.66
ϕ = ϕ∗ = 2 (1) 1.32 1.31 0.53 0.12 0.34 0.78
η = η∗ = 0.11 (0.2,0.13) 1.08 1.07 0.59 -0.15 0.08 0.28
η = η∗ = 0.3 (0.2,0.13) 1.44 1.42 0.43 0.24 0.45 0.86
φ = φ∗ = 0.8 (0.93,0.96) 1.03 1.02 0.56 -0.33 -0.08 0.39
φ = φ∗ = 0.99 (0.93,0.96) 1.54 1.51 0.48 0.72 0.93 1.35
λ = λ∗ = 0.20 (0.27, 0.30) 1.25 1.23 0.49 0.07 0.31 0.77
λ = λ∗ = 0.50 (0.27, 0.30) 1.42 1.42 0.54 0.09 0.23 0.51
Output and welfare multiplier size is insensitive to different assumptions concerning the
value of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. As would be expected, higher (lower) values of
the hysteresis parameters η and η∗ deliver higher (lower) estimates of output, employment
and welfare multipliers. Setting φ = 0.8 results in significantly lower output multipliers;
however, this value appears inconsistent with the mounting macroeconomic evidence re-
garding hysteresis effects, including that presented in this paper. Values of φ closer to and
perhaps even including unity provide a much better match to aggregate dynamics. Finally,
a lower (higher) proportion of Non-Ricardian workers generate lower (higher) output and
employment multipliers as would be expected.
6 Would a change in monetary policy framework have
improved outcomes?
Garga and Singh (2019) and Jordà et al. (2020) consider alternative monetary policy rules in
the presence of output hysteresis. Garga and Singh (2019) find output hysteresis arises away
from the ZLB where monetary policy is conducted based on the Taylor rule, but not under
strict inflation-targeting. In our model the ZLB does not bind, and strict inflation-targeting
offers only a minor improvement in output and employment outcomes in the domestic econ-
omy over the baseline monetary specification. This is because the weight on the output gap
in the domestic economy monetary policy reaction function is already low (µ2 = 0.2). As
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a consequence, we do not consider strict inflation-targeting as an alternate monetary policy
rule as they do.
Jordà et al. (2020) have recommended that central banks should augment standard
Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor type monetary reaction functions to lean against the accumu-
lated gaps in TFP growth generated by hysteresis. Similarly, Garga and Singh (2019) sug-
gest that an optimal monetary policy rule should target zero output hysteresis; however only
when the ZLB binds. All of the monetary policy reaction functions considered below feature
this quality, in that the central bank is assumed to react to the deviation of output from its
initial trend.
In particular, we consider three alternative simple monetary policy rules. Following the
advocacy of Bernanke (2017) and Bernanke et al. (2019) for temporary PLT in the post-
GFC period, and as a response to future ZLB episodes, we consider a simple PLT rule
where the price level replaces annualised inflation in the central banks reaction function. In
practice, this policy would make monetary policy history dependent in a manner similar to
the Federal Reserve’s recently announced adoption of a ‘flexible form of average inflation
targeting’ (Powell, 2020).
Blanchard et al. (2015), Reifschneider et al. (2015) and Yellen (2016) suggested that
central bank’s should place a higher weight on the output gap in their reaction functions in
response to hysteresis. To capture this intuition we propose two alternative simple nominal
income targeting rules, a nominal GDP level targeting (‘NGDPLT’) rule with equal weights
of 1.5 applied to the price level and output gap, and a nominal GDP growth targeting rule
(‘NGDPGT’) which attaches the same weights to annualised inflation and output growth.
We assume no change in interest rate smoothing under the alternative policy rules. In
the context of the post-GFC period NGDPLT was advocated by Woodford (2012, 2013)
and Sumner (2012), while McCallum (2015) has advocated for NGDPGT in preference to
NGDPLT on the basis that it is ‘time invariant’, which is to say that it would be chosen
under a monetary policy committent regime adopted in the distant past.
Table 5 sets out how output, employment and welfare multipliers vary under the alterna-
tive monetary policy rules. Overall, in response to the combined demand shocks simulated
in this paper, PLT delivers the highest output, employment and welfare multipliers relative
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to other simple monetary policy rules considered. Welfare multipliers are higher under PLT
predominantly because output is higher under the PLT rule compared to the other rules.
Output and employment multipliers are lowest under NGDPLT because this rule most vig-
orously counteracts the positive effects of fiscal stimulus on output. Output and employment
are actually substantially higher under NGDPLT compared to the other rules in the absence
of fiscal stimulus. Nonetheless, output multipliers remain above one and fiscal stimulus is
still welfare improving, contradicting views that NGDPLT negates the need for fiscal stimu-
lus in response to demand driven recessions (see Sumner, 2012). Indeed, in this paper output
and employment are always higher when fiscal stimulus is deployed in addition to monetary
stimulus under all alternative monetary policy specifications, with and without hysteresis
and credit constraints. Further when hysteresis effects are present, worker welfare is always
higher in the presence of fiscal stimulus than without it, regardless of the monetary policy
rule adopted.
Table 5: Multipliers under alternative simple monetary policy rules
Output Employment Welfare multipliers
Policy Rule CM NPVM CM % = 0 % = 0.4 % = 1
Baseline 1.28 1.27 0.50 0.08 0.31 0.75
NGDPGT 1.30 1.28 0.51 0.09 0.32 0.75
NGDPLT 1.12 1.11 0.45 0.04 0.30 0.80
PLT 1.34 1.33 0.54 0.13 0.40 0.92
Figure 7 indicates how the dynamic response of output changes in the model with hys-
teresis and credit constraints based on the alternate monetary policy scenarios. PLT clearly
dominates the other simple monetary policy rules in terms of output stabilisation. This is
interesting given Svensson’s (1999) argument that PLT should dominate inflation-targeting
in terms of output and inflation stabilisation where output and employment are moderately
persistent as is the case in our model. It should be stressed that this is in response to a
combination of demand shocks. In the model inflation-targeting and NGDPLT rules can
generate better output performance in the face of supply shocks, making the case stronger
for temporary PLT in response to demand driven recessions, or flexible average inflation
targeting more broadly.
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Figure 7: Dynamic response of output under alternative monetary policy (with hysteresis
and credit constraints), % deviation from steady state, quarterly
Interestingly, and consistent with Garga and Singh (2019), output is higher relative to
steady state the lower the weight placed on output in the monetary policy reaction function.
This finding, which runs counter to the policy suggestions of Yellen (2016), Reifschneider et
al. (2015) and Blanchard et al. (2015), is redolent of the Tinbergen (1952) principle that
policy makers should have as many instruments at their disposal as policy targets. That is,
when there are two policy targets, output and inflation stabilisation, at least two separate
policy instruments are required to attain the targets. This result also implies that if central
banks are trying to formalise discretion in a crisis scenario they should not opt for a variety of
‘flexible inflation-targeting’ that simply increases the weight afforded to output stabilisation
in an inflation-targeting reaction function.
Figure 8 sets out the dynamic responses of employment under alternative monetary policy
scenarios. PLT is again dominant in terms of short-run employment stabilisation compared
to the other rules. However, employment outcomes converge under all alternative simple
rules in the medium-term.
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Figure 8: Dynamic response of employment under alternative monetary policy arrangements
(with hysteresis and credit constraints), % deviation from steady state, quarterly
Why does PLT dominate the alternative monetary approaches in our model? Figure 9
indicates that real interest rates are persistently lower under PLT compared to the alternative
simple monetary policy rules. The ‘lower for longer’ dimension of PLT has been emphasised
by Bernanke (2017) and Bernanke et al. (2019) as a reason for supporting the adoption
of temporary PLT in response to major shocks that push economies against the ZLB. This
feature of PLT also explains why it outperforms an inflation-targeting rule augmented to
respond to TFP growth gaps generated by hysteresis in the spirit of Jordà et al. (2020).
Increasing real interest rates in response to a demand driven recession is a typical feature
of inflation targeting rules in contemporary New Keynesian models. In the open economy
context, the real exchange rate is also lower for longer under PLT, which enhances the
benefits of PLT over alternative rules.
Figure 9: Dynamic response of annual domestic real interest rates (ît −Et{π̂t+1}) under al-
ternative monetary policy arrangements (with hysteresis and credit constraints), percentage
point deviation from steady state, quarterly
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7 Conclusion
In this paper a small open economy TANK model is simulated to assess the efficacy of fiscal
stimulus in a small open economy with a floating exchange rate and inflation-targeting mon-
etary regime. The model is closely related to the textbook New Keynesian Open Economy
Model of Monacelli and Gaĺı (2005) and Gaĺı (2008) with a few twists. In the model a fraction
of households can only consume out of their current income. Further, the production tech-
nology features a simple ‘learning by doing’ mechanism whereby changes in employment can
persistently affect the level of productivity. We estimate model consistent parameters for the
‘learning by doing’ process using recent Australian data. Government is assumed to follow
a balanced budget strategy, while monetary authorities follow McKibbin-Henderson-Taylor
type rules.
Consistent with the evidence presented by Jordà et al. (2020), where hysteresis and
credit constraints are incorporated into the model, output can remain persistently below
its initial trend, whereas employment can recover to its initial steady state level within
typical business cycle frequencies. Our model also generates an empirically plausible degree
of hysteresis based on the evidence of Furceri at al. (2021), Kienzler and Schmid (2014),
and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014). Dynamic responses of key macroeconomic variables to
time preference, fiscal and monetary shocks calibrated to simulate the GFC provide a better
qualitative account of the data in the medium-term compared to those derived from models
without credit constrained agents or hysteresis effects.
We find that the presence of credit constraints and hysteresis effects amplifies the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool, and helps generate fiscal
multipliers consistent with estimates for advanced economies (see IMF, 2012 and Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko, 2012a and 2012b in particular). Employment multipliers are just un-
der half the magnitude of output multipliers, also consistent with recent empirical evidence.
With hysteresis and credit constrained households, welfare multipliers can be positive, and
output multipliers can exceed unity, even in a small open economy setting. This is because
credit constraints amplify the effect of fiscal stimulus on private consumption, and the hys-
teresis mechanism helps counteract crowding out due to monetary offset and real exchange
rate appreciation. From a policy perspective this implies that fiscal policy can be an effective
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macro-stabilisation tool even in the small open economy context, helping reverse hysteresis
effects in productivity and output, and restore full employment more rapidly.
Our analysis shows that hysteresis strengthens the argument in favour of temporary PLT
in response to a demand driven global recession, and the Federal Reserve’s new approach to
‘average inflation targeting’. Output, employment and welfare multipliers are higher under
PLT compared to all alternative monetary policy rules. PLT also provides superior output
and employment stabilisation performance compared to the baseline inflation-targeting rule,
and the two alternative nominal income targeting rules, when combined with fiscal stimulus.
This is because both the real interest rate and exchange rate are lower for longer under
PLT compared to other rules. Further, with hysteresis there is less monetary offset of fiscal
stimulus under PLT compared to the alternative rules. Under all alternative monetary
policy rules output, employment and worker welfare are higher when monetary stimulus is
combined with fiscal stimulus. These results reinforce the benefit of jointly considering the
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